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Abstract 
The structure, interdependence, and fragility of systems ranging from power-grids and 
transportation to ecology, climate, biology and even human communities and the Internet have 
been examined through network science. While response to perturbations has been quantified, 
recovery strategies for perturbed networks have usually been either discussed conceptually or 
through anecdotal case studies. Here we develop a network science based quantitative 
framework for measuring, comparing and interpreting hazard responses as well as recovery 
strategies. The framework, motivated by the recently proposed temporal resilience paradigm, is 
demonstrated with the Indian Railways Network. Simulations inspired by the 2004 Indian Ocean 
Tsunami and the 2012 North Indian blackout as well as a cyber-physical attack scenario illustrate 
hazard responses and effectiveness of proposed recovery strategies. Multiple metrics are used to 
generate various recovery strategies, which are simply sequences in which system components 
should be recovered after a disruption. Quantitative evaluation of these strategies suggests that 
faster and more efficient recovery is possible through network centrality measures. Optimal 
recovery strategies may be different per hazard, per community within a network, and for 
different measures of partial recovery. In addition, topological characterization provides a means 
for interpreting the comparative performance of proposed recovery strategies. The methods can 
be directly extended to other Large-Scale Critical Lifeline Infrastructure Networks including 
transportation, water, energy and communications systems that are threatened by natural or 
human-induced hazards, including cascading failures. Furthermore, the quantitative framework 
developed here can generalize across natural, engineered and human systems, offering an 
actionable and generalizable approach for emergency management in particular as well as for 
network resilience in general. 
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Introduction 
Complex networks have yielded novel insights across systems in ecology [1,2], climate 
[3], biology [4], transportation [5], water, power [6], and communications including the Internet 
[7,8] and social media [9]. Network science methods have resulted in actionable information on 
network vulnerabilities and fragility, especially in the context of response to disruptive events. 
Yet, network science methods have not often been used for post-perturbation recovery. In 
addition, they have not been used for developing a unified resilience framework that brings 
together event response with post-event recovery. However, a generalizable framework could 
help stakeholders of many complex systems design for, protect against, and recover from major 
disruptions. In this study, we develop such a framework in the context of natural and human-
induced hazards using the Indian Railways Network (IRN) as an illustrative case study.  
Large-Scale Critical Lifeline Infrastructure Networks (LSCLINs) include water 
distribution pipelines, power grids, telecommunication lines, railways, roadways, seaports, 
airports and communication networks. These LSCLINs are subject to growing threats from 
natural and man-made calamities, such as climate extremes, terrorism and cybercrimes. Aging of 
infrastructures, connectivity of lifeline functions, competition for resources, urbanization and 
movement towards coasts have exacerbated existing vulnerabilities. Resilience of LSCLINs has 
been recognized as an urgent societal imperative given the impact of recent hazards [10,11].  
Multiple definitions and frameworks for assessing resilience have been proposed in 
literature [12]. A recent correspondence piece in Nature [13] points out that characterizing and 
measuring resilience can be a challenge given that it takes on more than 70 definitions in 
literature. In this study, we adopt the definition of resilience to be: “the ability to prepare and 
plan for, absorb, recover from, and more successfully adapt to adverse events” proposed by the 
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National Academy of Sciences [14], a definition that been further conceptualized in recent 
literature [10]. We note that while many operational, organizational and human factors [15] 
contribute towards systems resilience, the scope of this study is restricted to the analysis of 
network structure with an underlying assumption that these factors remain stable before, during, 
and after a hazard. 
Literature has produced conceptual frameworks [10,11] for understanding resilience of 
LSCLINs. In addition, limited approaches for quantifying different aspects of resilience have 
been developed. Prior literature has proposed frameworks for quantification of resilience [16,17]  
with a focus on comparison of component-based retrofitting and structural restoration. However, 
as pointed out in [10], component-based risk management strategies may have limited utility for 
complex infrastructure system when diverse hazards need to be considered. One recent study 
proposed a framework for analyzing resilience based on modeling the functional dependencies 
among multiple systems, including critical infrastructures [18]. Another used a technique for 
measuring a system’s ability to recover from disruptions; the method was based on stochastically 
ranking the importance of the system’s components [19]. Yet another discussed quantifying the 
resilience of networked systems using network flow dynamics, metricizing resilience by using a 
“figure-of-merit” [20]. The figure-of-merit was essentially casted as a stand-in for any given 
specific metric describes the ability of a system to function successfully. The authors themselves 
[20] noted that while this metric theoretically characterizes a system’s resilience, calculating it 
might not be trivial in real life settings, as it depends on parameters that may not actually be easy 
to obtain. These types of proposed models attempted to incorporate various realistic metrics, 
such as resistance of components to disturbance, duration of disturbance, counts of failing 
components [18], network vulnerability and survivability [19], and ability of a system to function 
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successfully [20]. Yet, overall, these approaches involve a number of parameters that may be 
hard to estimate or obtain, limiting their general applicability.  
Other researchers proposed a three-stage resilience framework to quantify the resilience 
of networked urban infrastructures [16]. This research highlighted that while recovery sequences 
play a crucial role in resilience improvement in the context of finite resources, deploying 
redundancy, hardening critical components and ensuring rapid recovery are all effective 
responses regardless of their ordering to build resilience. Although network science frameworks 
were used to model the infrastructures, a pre-selected network measure was employed to 
generate the recover strategy in a resource-limited scenario. Another recent study [21]  proposed 
a methodology for joint restoration modeling of interdependent infrastructure systems 
exemplified through interdependent gas and power system at county level impacted by hurricane.  
Here, genetic algorithm-derived scores were used to generate recovery sequences. As noted by 
the researchers, the proposed framework requires multiple models to function, including a hazard 
generation model, component fragility models and system performance models. We note that in 
both framework [16,21] ,  damage and recovery of components (or nodes) was informed by 
disaster-specific fragility curves, which would not be readily available for many LSCLINs that 
face a variety of potential threats (perhaps unlike smaller urban or county scale networks).  
We argue that the theory and tools provided by complex networks science can be 
developed or extended to produce a generalizable quantitative framework for characterizing and 
evaluating LSCLIN resilience. Network science has been used to understand the global air traffic 
networks, which have been delineated into communities that conveyed information beyond 
geopolitics, and examined through weighted networks for improved understanding of topology 
[22].Transportation networks at city scales have been examined through quantitative assessment 
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of fragility [23] but only with qualitative recovery strategies [24]. Air transportation systems 
have been modeled as dynamical complex networks to study the performances of air traffic 
managements systems under increasing traffic loads [25].   Cascading failure of links in power 
networks has been analyzed using random geometric graphs and percolation-based analysis [26]. 
Network science methods [7] coupled with computer technology [8] have been used to examine 
the robustness of the worldwide Internet network. The fragility of interdependent networks has 
been modeled and examined through simulations [27], including in a study where cascading 
failures across lifelines in Italy [28] were used as motivating examples. Another study [29] 
developed a generic network science-based approach to identify a system’s response to a wide 
range of hazards; this study quantifies resilience using synthetic graphs and Linux software 
networks. That study proposed an approach that allows evaluation of resilience across time. The 
results demonstrated that how parameterizations for features such as redundancy, node recovery 
time, and backup supply available could be tuned to obtain a desired resilience state. While it 
suggests applicability of complex network-based algorithms for quantifying resilience, the 
proposed framework was only validated using synthetic and simulated graphs. Moreover, 
obtaining the parameter information to validate the proposed strategies for LSCLINs is a non-
trivial task. A study proposed a network science based method for analyzing the resilience of the 
Chinese railway network as well as a method for optimizing the design of transportation 
networks, but not the methods for recovering existing ones [30] .  
To date, no study we are aware of has put forth an approach for translating recently 
proposed conceptual resilience curves [10] to practical tools for LSCLINs based on real world 
data. The network science centric framework offered in the current study is a data-driven 
embodiment of those conceptual resilience curves [10]. We show how it can be used to measure 
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the response of LSCLINs to multiple hazards as well as to generate and compare the 
effectiveness of restoration strategies in a quantitative and generalizable manner.  
The previous literature [17,31] has examined restoration methods in the context of 
specific hazard types and infrastructure systems [33], often with known fragility models [17]  or 
resource constraints [16] or other component level information , and occasionally with a 
recovery sequence predetermined through the selection of specific network metrics [16]. This 
paper presents a new generic data-driven version of the formerly conceptual resilience curves 
[10], which, as previously discussed, is particularly applicable to multi-hazard resilience of 
LSCLINs where fragility or component level information may not be available. 
We illustrate this framework using the Indian Railways Network (IRN), the largest 
railways in the world in terms of passenger-kilometers transported per year. The IRN is among 
the most important lifelines in India. It transports more than 8.4 billion passengers annually and 
has played an important role in the nation’s economy as well as in relief and rescue operations 
after both man-made and natural hazards [32]. For example, after 2013’s Cyclone Phailin, the 
IRN played an important role across the eastern coast of the nation [33]. Given the economic and 
societal importance of this network, maintaining its functionality is crucial. 
Materials and Methods 
Indian Railways Network data 
Here, we analyze origin-destination data of passenger-carrying trains on the IRN. The network is 
constructed using publicly available data, which was cleaned and appropriately formatted prior 
to analysis. Open-source express and local passenger trains data are available on the following 
websites: 
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http://www.indianrail.gov.in/mail_express_trn_list.html, http://www.indianrailways.in/train-list. 
This data is compiled by Ixigo, an e-ticket booking company and is publicly available on: 
http://www.ixigo.com/trains/trains. We model the IRN as an origin-destination network. We 
considered stations with at least one originating or terminating train, comprising a total of 809 
stations with 7066 trains as of October 30, 2014. This study only considers origin and destination 
stations, since data from stations that are between origins and destinations are usually not freely 
and widely available. Only 752 of the 809 stations are part of the giant component (the largest 
connected group of stations). We focus our analyses on this subset. 
Characterizing the IRN topology 
Each station’s degree, or connectivity, is measured by the number of connections it has with 
other stations. Each station’s strength is measured by its traffic volume in terms of the total 
number of trains that originate or terminate at that station. Strength is defined this way with the 
hypothesis that traffic volume may be a useful metric for understanding failure and/or for 
prioritizing stations during recovery. Two stations i and j are considered to be connected with an 
edge if there exists a train between the pair of stations such that a train originating at i terminates 
at j. Elements of the adjacency matrix {aij} are 1 if the train originating from station i terminates 
at station j and 0 otherwise. The weight of an edge is calculated as the number of trains running 
between a pair of stations in either direction. Thus, any element of the weighted adjacency 
matrix {wij} is the number of trains originating from station i and terminating at station j. The 
connections were almost all bidirectional; specifically, the numbers of trains connecting pairs of 
stations in one direction were different from the other directions in less than 250 out of the 
654,481 possible cases (less than 0.04% of cases). The traffic flow matrix could therefore be 
made symmetric without much distortion of the network by selecting the larger non-zero value 
per station pair. Hence, the IRN is analyzed as an undirected weighted network. To understand 
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the structure of IRN, we calculate the degree and strength distribution of the stations. The 
cumulative degree distribution 𝑃	  (𝑘 > 𝐾) gives the probability that a station has more than K 
connections to other stations and is defined as: 
                                       𝑃 𝑘 > 𝐾 = 1 − 𝑝	  (𝑘),-.-/01                                                   (1) 
where 𝑝(𝑘) is number of stations having degree 𝑘 divided by total number of stations and 𝑘234 
is the minimum degree found over all nodes in the network. Similarly, the cumulative 
distribution of strength 𝑃(𝑆 > 𝑠) gives the probability that station has more than S originating 
(or terminating) trains, i.e., traffic volume. The cumulative degree and strength distributions 
follow truncated power law models. Most stations have a small number of connections, with the 
exception of several hubs that are generally related to major metropolitan areas and are 
geographically isolated from each other.  
 We also use the modularity-based [34] Louvain community detection algorithm to 
characterize the topology of the IRN. The weighted adjacency matrix defined earlier is used as 
the input for the community detection. Throughout the manuscript, we use the terms 
“community” and “module” interchangeably.  
The topology of the network provides interpretation for the IRN’s robustness to and 
recovery from different types and geographical origins of hazards, a topic that is discussed more 
in Results. 
Network robustness and recovery 
Quantifying resilience entails measuring the failure and recovery processes, which 
effectively requires the ability to measure the critical functionality of the IRN at any given state. 
Critical functionality is metricized as follows. We utilize the giant component, a common 
network science metric that measures the largest connected set of nodes in the network (i.e., in 
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the IRN defined here, within the giant component, one could travel from any station i to any 
other station j by at least one path) [35]. Total Functionality (TF) is the number of stations in the 
giant component when the network is completely functional; thus, in our case, TF=752. 
Fragmented Functionality (FF) is the number of stations in the giant component at any given step 
wherein one or more stations are incapacitated by disruptions (either during failure or recovery). 
We define State of Critical Functionality (SCF) =FF / TF; thus effectively, SCF is a 
measurement of critical functionality at any step normalized between 0 and 1. The SCF metric 
developed here, based on percolation theory [7], is similar to those developed in previous work 
on social networks [37]. 
 Methods based on percolation theory have been widely used to understand the fragility 
of isolated systems such as the Internet [7], as well as interdependencies among the network 
multiplex[36,38]. However, the recovery strategies developed here differ from a straightforward 
application of percolation theory in that the sequence of node recovery does not necessarily 
follow the sequence in which the nodes were damaged during network collapse.  
The network recovery sequences may be random (which can be particularly useful as a 
baseline for testing the effectiveness of non-random recovery sequences), based on station 
attributes (such as degree or strength), or based on network attributes (such as centrality).  
Recovery takes on the following process: 
1.   SCF (as defined above) is computed at the initial post-hazard state. 
2.   A prioritization sequence is identified. This prioritization sequence is the order in 
which nodes should regain their full functionality. For example, restoring the 
node A to full functionality requires restoring all edges connected to the node and 
partially activating the nodes which are one step from node A. Nodes that are 
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partially activated may not have full functionality, since for these nodes, only the 
edges that directly lead to fully functional node are recovered. This sequence can 
be generated randomly, through intuitive metrics, or through network science 
metrics (discussed soon). 
3.   Given a sequence, iteratively until SCF=1: 
a.   The next station in the prioritization sequence is restored to full 
functionality, re-establishing the traffic flow between this station and the 
stations to which it is connected. This grows the giant component. 
b.   FF is recalculated. 
c.   SCF is recalculated. 
  We note that time reversal asymmetry has been observed in the recovery of financial 
systems as a result of external forces as shown in [39]. However, the time reversal asymmetry in 
SCF in our algorithm, while apparently similar, has a different explanation and happens to be a 
consequence of the proposed recovery process (Fig. 1). 
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Fig. 1 – Node removal and recovery process in the representative network with N=6 
Nodes X and Y are selected randomly for removal at time, T=1 and T=2, respectively. A. (i) The 
SCF=1 at step T=0 (pre-hazard). Node X (red) is selected for removal at step T=1. (ii) Removal 
of node X results in reduction of the size of the Giant Component (GC), which sets SCF=0.5. 
Dashed nodes (edges) means that nodes (edges) gets detached from the GC and hence 
incapacitated.  Node Y (blue) is selected for removal at step T=2 (f=1/6, meaning one out of the 
six nodes is targeted for removal). (iii) The GC ceases to exist after the removal of node Y. B. To 
highlight the asymmetric nature of recovery process, nodes are restored to their full functionality 
in the same order these were removed (i.e. node X followed by node Y) from the network. 
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 (iv) Node X (yellow) is selected for restoration to full functionality in the first step of the 
recovery process. (v) This results in the recovery of the node X to full functionality (f’=1/6, 
meaning one out of the six nodes is fully functional). As a result, three nodes directly connected 
to X gain at least one edge and the GC grows, making SCF=0.67. Then, node Y (green) is 
selected for recovery in step (vi). Recovery of node Y to its full functionality result in restoration 
of the SCF of the network to 1 as shown in (vi) 
 In practice, this is repeated with different sets of priority sequences in order to compare 
the effectiveness of different recovery strategies. Random sequences of node prioritization are 
used as a baseline to test the effectiveness of non-random strategies. We consider strategies 
based on descending order of degree and strength, which represent intuitive (“connectivity”, and 
“traffic volume”, respectively) recovery sequencing choices. Additionally, we consider several 
network centrality metrics: first, betweenness centrality of a particular node can be interpreted as 
the number of times a station acts as a bridge along the shortest path between two other stations. 
In the present context, it is the number of shortest paths connecting any two stations that involve 
a transfer at particular station. Betweenness centrality of each station, Bk, is normalized by 
dividing it by the network average betweenness centrality, <B>. Second, to understand the 
importance of stations due to its connections, we measure Eigenvector centrality. Here, a relative 
score is assigned to each station in the network, where a score is higher when its connections are 
themselves highly connected stations. Finally, closeness centrality of a node is calculated as the 
inverse of the average network distance of a given station to all other stations. 
Results 
This section first presents results pertaining to IRN robustness and recovery, followed by an 
analysis and interpretation of IRN topology with implications for resilience.     
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Robustness and recovery results 
Fig. 2A displays the IRN origin-destination network. As described in the Materials and Methods 
section, nodes are sized by traffic volume and colored according to community association. The 
12-largest communities capture the vast majority (91.6%) of the railway stations. While the 
topology is discussed later in the Topology of the IRN and resilience implications subsection, 
Fig. 1A serves to provide context for the robustness and recovery results.  
Fig. 2B (left panel) translates the formerly conceptual hazard response curves [10] into 
quantitative terms, with the IRN functionality degrading owing to either targeted station removal 
or random failures (RF) (e.g., potentially from random but typical service disruptions). The 
targeted station removals may be caused by targeted attacks (TA) that prioritize the stations to be 
taken down by connectivity or degree (Targeted Attack – Degree, TA-D), or by traffic volume or 
strength (Targeted Attack – Strength, TA-S). Network robustness computations applied to the 
IRN suggest that while RF would need to eliminate 95% of the stations for near complete loss of 
functionality; the corresponding numbers are 25% and 23% for TA-S and TA-D respectively.  
In the right panel of Fig 2B, recovery strategies are compared for the case where the IRN 
starts at a SCF=0, i.e., completely unconnected and dysfunctional. Three types of recovery 
alternatives are evaluated. First, N=1000 random sequences serves as a baseline for comparison. 
The second set of strategies, perhaps the most immediately intuitive, is based on station attributes 
including connectivity and traffic volume. The third set of strategies is based on network 
centrality measures, specifically eigenvector (by average importance of connected stations), 
closeness (by average proximity, in a network connectivity but not necessarily a geographic 
sense, to other stations) and betweenness (by the average number of times any passenger 
traveling between origin-destination station pairs need to go through the station under 
consideration).  
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Fig. 2. IRN and resilience curves under complete failure and recovery. 
A. The IRN is displayed. The 12-largest communities, each of which map to a color, capture the 
vast majority (91.6%) of the stations. Stations are sized by traffic volume. B. (Left) We quantify 
the robustness of IRN as it responds to random versus intentional attacks, where intentional 
attacks are motivated by either railway station connectivity (degree) or traffic volume (strength). 
For intentional attacks, approximately 20% of stations must be disrupted for the full IRN to lose 
all critical functionality, as measured with SCF. (Right) Using the same metric SCF, recovery 
strategies that propose alternative prioritizations for recovery of stations are compared, using an 
N=1000 ensemble of randomly generated sequences as a baseline. Number of connections 
(degree) and traffic volume (strength) are used as intuitive measures for generating recovery 
sequences, and the results are plotted. In addition, betweenness, Eigenvector, and closeness 
centrality are used, and the results are plotted. 
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 In this case, IRN recovery is most efficient at most stages of partial or full recovery when 
betweenness centrality is chosen as for generating a recovery sequence. The efficiency of each 
recovery sequence is measured by computing its corresponding Impact Area [16,21]  (IA). In the 
present case, IA is defined as the area between recovery curve and Y-axis representing SCF. 
Hence, a smaller IA signals a more efficient recovery strategy.  On average, random recovery 
sequences have an IA  (averaged over the N=1000 random sequences) that is at least 250% larger 
than the betweenness centrality-based sequence. The betweenness centrality-based sequence also 
has a 67% smaller IA than the sequence based on connectivity (degree). The interpretation for 
the performance of betweenness centrality in this case is discussed in the Topology of the IRN 
and resilience implications subsection. 
The suitability of the framework for not only the full IRN but also its relatively 
independent communities (see Topology of the IRN and resilience implications subsection for 
discussion on communities) is studied. By proxy, the insights may generalize to LSCLINs in 
general and other systems, such as in food webs and ecological networks [40–43]. The two 
largest communities (as shown in Fig. 2A) were considered separately and analyzed in Fig. 3. 
While for full recovery betweenness centrality is the most efficient strategy, at some stages of 
partial recovery, the most efficient metric is less clear. For the community spanning South India, 
closeness centrality generates a particularly suboptimal sequence. This is likely a consequence of 
the fact that there are many geospatially proximal stations in this region that are not connected to 
many others. In both communities analyzed (South and North India), betweenness centrality 
ultimately emerges as the best metric for prioritizing stations for recovering the full IRN or the 
vast majority of its functionality. The results suggest that the framework generalizes but that the 
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choice of the most appropriate recovery strategy may depend on the network, the community, or 
the desired state of recovery (i.e., level of desired SCF). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 – Resilience curves for the IRN’s two largest communities. 
The same as Fig. 2B is demonstrated for the two largest communities shown in Fig. 2A. A. The 
same as Fig. 2B is displayed but for the largest community (in South India, Community ID 1 
from Fig 1B). B. The same as Fig. 2B. is shown but for the second largest community (in North 
India, Community ID 2 from Fig. 2A) with the inset showing that, at different levels of partial 
recovery (e.g., SCF ~= 0.4), it is not always clear which metric is most effective for prioritizing 
stations.  
Although Figs. 1-2 readily provide a translation of previously conceptual temporal 
resilience curves [10] to those based on data, it may not be realistic for the network recovery 
process to begin from a state of complete disrepair (i.e., at SCF=0). This motivates testing the 
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utility of the framework on exemplary set of realistic hazards that only partially incapacitate the 
IRN.  
We examine the recovery portion of the framework subject to three specific hazards. Fig. 
4 illustrates the geographic characteristics of the three hazards as well as their impact on 
community structure; interpretation of the community structure is discussed more in the 
Topology of the IRN and resilience implications subsection. First, a simulation inspired by the 
2004 Indian Ocean tsunami [44] removes 9% of stations on the southeastern Indian coast. 
Second, we simulate a scenario based on a cascade from the power grid, similar to the fallout 
from the historically massive 2012 blackout [45]. Finally, we simulate a cyber or cyber-physical 
attack scenario, where the stations are perhaps maliciously targeted based on traffic volume, and 
the network structure is fractured significantly. Consequences of physical- and cyber-attacks are 
based on hypothetical scenarios, although motivated from real-world events such as the terror 
attack of 26th November 2008 (the “26/11 Mumbai terror attack”), impacting the “Mumbai” 
station [46]. Cyber-physical terror attacks may be region-specific, but the possibility of 
coordinated attacks exists, especially for cyber.  The post hazard SCF values are 0.903, 0.852, 
and 0.890 (679, 641, and 669 nodes remaining in the giant component) respectively for the three 
hazards, and recovery begins from these starting points.  S1 Table shows which stations were 
removed for each of the three hazards.  
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Fig 4. Simulating the impact of realistic natural and man-made hazards. 
The top row schematically illustrates portions of the IRN initially impacted by realistic 
natural and cyber or cyber-physical threat scenarios, all with the same initial network topology as 
shown in Fig. 2A, where 752 stations reside in the largest giant component (SCF=1). The bottom 
row displays the community structure post hazard in each case. A. The impact of a disaster with 
properties similar to that of the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami is displayed. As suggested 
by the insight that communities are relatively independent as obtained from Fig. 2, the regional 
nature of the hazard (shaded blue, top) significantly impacts the Southeastern coast, removing 28 
stations. The number of communities increases from 49 to 75. Yet, the structure of the remainder 
of the network remains relatively intact (SCF=0.903, where 679 stations remain in the giant 
component, see Methods and Data). B. For a simulated cyber or cyber-physical attack scenario, 
where 19 stations are perhaps maliciously targeted based on traffic volume (nodes shaded grey, 
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top) and removed, the network structure is fractured significantly (SCF=0.890, where 669 
stations remain in the giant component). The number of communities increases from 49 to 96. C. 
A scenario based on a cascade from the power grid, similar to the 2012 blackout (shaded grey, 
top) is also simulated. The impact is significant, removing 39 stations, but the degradation of the 
IRN remains regionally contained (SCF=0.852, where 641 stations remain in the giant 
component). The number of communities increases from 49 to 102. Note that differences that 
appear relatively in the SCF can have significant practical implications with a large network. In 
the case of the IRN given TF=752, an SCF dropping by about 0.01 means 10 less stations are 
part of the giant component. 
Fig. 5 A-C show recovery curves like those in Fig. 2B and Fig. 3 but starting from these 
states of functionality. Again, an ensemble of N=1000 members of random sequences are used in 
each case as a baseline. All metrics lead to recovery sequences that are almost always more 
effective than the random sequences. Fig. 5 D-F captures the percentage of random ensemble 
members that are exceeded by each strategy at each recovery step in terms of SCF. Here, it is 
less clear which metrics lead to the most effective recovery sequences in general. In all three 
cases, a choice of betweenness centrality leads to total functionality (SCF=1) earliest, although at 
earlier stages other metrics are at times preferable. 
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Fig 5. Recovery from simulated natural and man-made hazards. 
A. Recovery curves after the simulated tsunami are displayed. As a baseline, the gray 
shaded interval represents the 99% bounds of N=1000 randomly generated recovery sequences. 
At each step, the 99% bounds are the 5th and 995th largest SCF values from the N=1000 member 
ensemble. The SCF begins at 0.903. B. The same as A is displayed but for the simulated cyber-
physical attack. Here, the SCF begins at 0.852. C. The same as A is displayed but for the 
simulated power grid failure cascade. Here the SCF begins at 0.890. D. For the tsunami, at each 
step of the recovery curve, the percentage of ensemble members that a given metric is larger than 
in terms of SCF is plotted. This is repeated for each metric (connectivity, traffic volume, 
betweenness centrality, Eigenvector centrality, and closeness centrality). E. The same as D but 
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for the cyber-physical attack recovery curve. F. The same as D but for the power grid failure 
cascade. In D-F, in some cases, lines overlap each other; when this is the case, one line is thicker 
than the other to enable visibility of both. 
Topology of the IRN and resilience implications 
Analysis of the topological characteristics of the IRN lends a degree of interpretability to 
both the fragility and recovery components of the resilience results captured in Fig. 2, Fig 3, and 
Fig. 5.  
First, Fig. 6A displays a cumulative probability distribution of stations’ degree and 
strength (connectivity and traffic volume). They both follow truncated power distributions (see 
Materials and Methods). Several stations are hubs, but most have a small number of connections. 
The hubs tend to be geographically distant from each other. Table 1 provides additional details 
for the hubs shown here, delineating those that are labeled with the same city for brevity. 
Furthermore, Fig. 6B shows a correlation profile of the connectivity of the stations, which shows 
that stations with high connectivity do not tend to be connected to others with high connectivity. 
Hence, hubs tend to be not only distant from each other geographically but also in terms of 
network distance. 
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Table 1– Network summary statistics on 25 most connected (highest degree) stations 
Stations 
(Metro regions*) Degree Strength 
Closeness 
Centrality 
Betweenness 
Centrality 
Eigenvector 
Centrality 
Howrah (Kolkata) 77 133 0.41 0.11 1.00 
New Delhi (Delhi) 62 126 0.39 0.06 0.84 
Delhi (Delhi) 59 109 0.36 0.06 0.54 
LokManyaTilak(Mumbai)  56 93 0.39 0.07 0.75 
Chennai  49 86 0.39 0.06 0.71 
Ahmedabad 48 83 0.38 0.06 0.76 
Mumbai (Mumbai) 46 130 0.37 0.04 0.51 
Yesvantpur (Bengaluru) 44 62 0.38 0.04 0.65 
 Hazrat Nizammudin 
(Delhi) 42 65 0.37 0.03 0.63 
Pune  41 70 0.38 0.03 0.62 
Bangalore (Bengaluru)  39 69 0.36 0.04 0.44 
Patna  39 72 0.37 0.04 0.52 
Secunderabad  39 66 0.37 0.05 0.52 
Jaipur 37 57 0.36 0.03 0.53 
Amritsar  36 64 0.36 0.03 0.50 
Puri 36 53 0.37 0.03 0.58 
Jammu Tawi 35 47 0.37 0.02 0.60 
Varanasi  35 51 0.37 0.03 0.50 
Ajmer  34 42 0.37 0.02 0.58 
Bandra  34 50 0.35 0.01 0.50 
Gorakhpur  33 62 0.36 0.03 0.50 
Visakhapatnam 32 49 0.35 0.02 0.35 
Tirupati 31 49 0.34 0.02 0.36 
Indore  30 38 0.36 0.02 0.48 
Kolkata (Kolkata) 29 36 0.35 0.02 0.43 
*Metro regions are indicated within parentheses to delineate hubs shown more than once in Fig. 5A 
 
Referring back to Fig. 2A, communities tend to be associated with one or a few large 
stations and are typically guided by geographical distance as well as by cultural or linguistic 
closeness. Thus, while most communities tend to be regionally grouped, notable exceptions to 
this rule exist, reflecting high connections among larger but geographically distant stations, 
notably near Delhi and Kolkata. Since the communities are detected based on systematic analysis 
of traffic flow properties, they serve as a more appropriate characterization of modular structure 
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than more conventional – but from the network perspective, arbitrary – divisions, such as 
railways jurisdictions or political boundaries.  
Fig. 6 A-B, in conjunction with the dominance of the geographic grouping structure 
revealed by the community detection algorithm shown in Fig. 2A, imply that the IRN as a whole 
tends to function like a group of loosely connected, relatively independent modules.  
These topological features provide intuition into recovery results. For the results shown 
in Fig. 2B and Fig. 3A-B, namely those where the IRN is recovered from complete dysfunction, 
betweenness centrality outperforms other metrics at most stages of partial recovery. That the IRN 
generally tends to function as a group of relatively independent modules lends interpretation 
here: stations with higher values of betweenness centrality act as key bridges between those 
modules. Hence, recovering those key bridge stations earlier in the sequence help rapidly grow 
the giant component by connecting groups that will be large but otherwise unconnected. Finally, 
Fig. 6C shows rank correlation for each centrality metric with degree and strength. Correlations 
are positive and increasing, but rank orders are substantially different. This means that sequences 
generated from these metrics differ substantially as well, providing insight into the observed 
wide gaps often seen betweenness centrality-generated recovery curves and others, including 
degree and strength.  
The best performing metric is less clear for recovery from the three simulated hazards. 
While all proposed metrics almost always outperform the randomly generated recovery 
sequences, the IRN is not nearly as fragmented when recovery begins. Modules are not as 
disconnected, and hence betweenness centrality is no longer clearly preferable to other metrics.  
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Fig. 6 – Topology of the IRN 
A. A cumulative probability distribution of node degree and strength (as measured by traffic 
volume) of stations in IRN, on a log-log scale, profile the distributional properties of the stations. 
The distributions follow truncated power law models, wherein most stations have a small number 
of connections, with the exception of a few hubs. Hubs are generally geospatially isolated. “k” 
stands for degree, and “s” stands for strength. Several cities are labeled multiple times as they 
contain more than one hub. For example, Delhi actually has multiple hub stations, specifically 
stations named “Hazrat Nizammudin”, “New Delhi” and “Delhi”; Delhi was used for brevity to 
represent all three. Table 1 details and delineates all stations that have been named identically in 
this panel. B. A correlation profile of station connectivity of IRN shows the average degree of 
stations’ nearest network neighbors. K1 and K2 serve to index the degree of any given station. 
Correlations in connectivity are shown as systematic deviations of the ratio P(K1,K2)/Pr(K1,K2). 
P(K1,K2) is the likelihood that two stations with connectivity K1 and K2 are connected to each 
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other by the direct link. Pr(K1,K2) is the same value in averaged over a randomized ensemble of 
1000 members. Yellow colors in the lower left indicate the tendency of stations with less 
connectivity to connect to other stations with comparable connectivity, while blue/green colors 
indicate small likelihood of hubs connecting with one another indicating the IRN’s disassortative 
nature. This further captures the tendency of the IRN to behave like a collection of relatively 
independent modules. C. Degree and strength are plotted against betweenness, closeness and 
Eigenvector centrality. Lines indicate the average for a centrality measure conditional on a 
particular degree or level strength, respectively, serving to highlight the variability in centrality 
metrics even for identical levels of connectivity or traffic volume.    
 
Discussion 
This study presents a complex networks-based unified framework that goes beyond fragility 
characterization and conceptual resilience curves to offer data-driven, quantitative insights for 
decision-making before, during and after hazards to enable preparedness, relief and recovery.  
While the fragility characterization may be considered an adaptation of existing network 
science methods, recovery curves are new and can generalize to other applications. The 
framework developed here allows for generation and performance comparison of multiple station 
recovery sequences, allowing for the possibility that different networks should be recovered 
according to sequences generated from different metrics. The recovery differs from a 
straightforward application of percolation theory in that the sequence of node recovery does not 
necessarily follow the sequence in which they were damaged during network collapse. The 
recovery of a node accompanies the recovery of the links and hence traffic flow to directly 
connected nodes.  
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This study also characterizes the topology of the IRN, linking insights from the analysis 
to the performance of best performing recovery strategies. In this case, betweenness centrality 
tends to generate the best performing recovery sequences due to the inherent modularity of the 
system. Recovering stations that serve as key bridges between these modules tend to bring 
functionality online most effectively. It is not clear whether betweenness centrality-based 
sequences would perform best for all LSCLINs; however, topological analyses similar to the one 
conducted in this study may help provide interpretability for best performing metrics for other 
LSCLINs as well.    
Anticipatory analysis may help stakeholders design systematic recovery strategies for 
LSCLINs including transportation, water and wastewater, power and fuels, and communications 
systems. In addition to engineered systems such as LSCLINs, the approach can be generalized to 
natural systems such as ecological networks [43] subjected to perturbations [40,41].  
Future extensions to the network resilience framework may need to consider the 
formulation of an efficient algorithm to approximate the optimal recovery strategy in light of 
recent literature on influence maximization [47] based on percolation theory [38,48,49]  . 
Inclusion of link damage or removal information or metadata, resource mobilization strategies, 
structural redundancies [50], organizational, social and human factors as well as the 
consideration of dynamic network flow properties, including time varying network attributes [3] 
and real-time data ingestion could be valuable avenues to explore in future extensions of this 
study.  
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S1	  Table:	  List of the stations removed for each of the three hazards 
Tsunami Power Failure Cyber-Physical 
Bhubaneswar Ajmer  Ahmedabad  
Chennai Central Ambala Cant  Bangalore City 
Chennai Egmore Amritsar  Chennai Central 
Cuttack Anand Vihar  Chennai Egmore 
Ernakulam  Asansol  Delhi 
Gudivada Bareilly H Nizamuddin 
Guntur  Bareilly City Howrah Jn 
Kanyakumari Bikaner  Hyderabad Decan 
Kochuveli Danapur Jaipur 
Kollam Jn Darbhanga  Kacheguda 
Machilipatnam Delhi Kolkata 
Madurai Delhi S Rohilla Lokmanyatilak  
Mayiladuthurai Dibrugarh Mumbai  
Nagercoil  Dibrugarh Town New Delhi 
Narasapur Firozpur Cant Pune  
Puducherry Ghaziabad Sealdah 
Puri Gorakhpur Secunderabad  
Rameswaram Guwahati Shalimar 
Sengottai H Nizamuddin Yesvantpur  
Tiruchendur Howrah   
Tiruchirapalli Jaipur  
Tirunelveli Jammu Tawi  
Tirupati Kamakhya  
Trivandrum  Kanpur Anwrganj  
Tuticorin Kanpur Central  
Vijayawada Kolkata  
Villupuram  Lal Kuan  
Visakhapatnam Lucknow  
 Lucknow   
 Muzaffarpur   
 New Delhi  
 New Tinsukia  
 Palwal  
 Patna  
 Pratapnagar  
 Puri  
 Sealdah  
 Tinsukia  
 Varanasi   
 
